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I. INTRODUCTION 
China and the United States are engaged in international trade disputes 
within the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) dispute settlement system which 
are currently at a boiling point.1 On June 4, 2012, the U.S. Commerce 
Department announced that it will likely impose a thirty-one percent tariff on all 
solar panel imports from China.2 Two other recent disputes, filed in September 
and October 2011, include allegations by the United States that China improperly 
levied tariffs on Chinese chicken imports and that China failed to disclose details 
of 200 Chinese subsidies as required by the WTO.3 Imposing tariffs on 
international imports between the United States and China is reciprocal.4 China 
announced on December 16, 2011 that it will impose anti-dumping tariffs on 
imported U.S. vehicles with engines of 2.5-litres or above, effective from 
December 15, 2011, and lasting two years.5 These recent examples illustrate the 
current volatile nature of global trade between two of the largest importing and 
exporting countries in the world.6 
Over the past decade, despite numerous safeguard complaints filed by the 
United States against China alleging trade violations, not one has been 
completely upheld by the WTO Appellate Body (“AB”).7 This trend ended on 
 
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2013; B.A., 
Psychology, Arizona State University, 2003. I would like to thank Professor Michael P. Malloy for his insights 
and support throughout the publication process. Additionally, I would like to thank my wife and five children 
for their continued encouragement and affection. 
1. Kara Loridas, United States-China Trade War: Signs of Protectionism in a Globalized Economy?, 34 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 403, 403 (2011); see generally Keith Bradsher, 200 Chinese Subsidies Violate 
Rules, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/business/us-says-some-
chinese-subsidies-violate-trade-
rules.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=200%20Chinese%20Subsidies%20Violate%20Rules&st=cse. 
2. Dan Springer, Obama Administration’s Proposed Tariff on Chinese Solar Panels Raises Fear of 
Trade War, FOX NEWS (June 4, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/06/04/us-solar-panel-trade-war-
with-china/. 
3. U.S. Files Complaint Against Chinese Chicken Tariffs, FOX NEWS (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www. 
foxnews.com/world/2011/09/20/us-files-complaint-against-chinese-chicken-tariffs/; Bradsher, supra note 1; see 
generally Garrett E. Lynam, Using WTO Countervailing Duty Law to Combat Illegally Subsidized Chinese 
Enterprises Operating in a Nonmarket-Economy: Deciphering the Writing on the Wall, 42 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 739 (2010) (describing implications of illegal Chinese subsidies in relation to WTO obligations and 
their effects on international trade). 
4. See generally Lynam, supra note 3. 
5. China’s Duties on US Imports Will Not Have Major Impact, AUTOS INSIGHT (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.autosinsight.com/file/107508/chinas-duties-on-us-imports-will-not-have-major-impact.html. 
6. China Trade Profile, WTO (Oct. 2011), http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView. 
aspx?Language=E&Country=CN; United States Trade Profile, WTO (Oct. 2011), http://stat.wto.org/Country 
Profile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=US. 
7. Wenhua Ji & Cui Huang, China’s Experience in Dealing with WTO Dispute Settlement: A Chinese 
Perspective, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 11 (2011). From 2001 to the current tire dispute, the United States has filed 
six petitions under safeguard measures. The U.S. International Trade Commission (“USITC”) rejected two 
petitions after determining that market disruption had not been established. In the other four instances, President 
Bush used his discretionary authority and denied granting relief. Id. Prior to the tire dispute, the last safeguard 
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September 5, 2011, when the AB issued its report regarding Measures Affecting 
Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres8 from China (“AB 
Tire Report”) in favor of the United States.9 It was the first time the WTO 
completely upheld any kind of safeguard measure.10 
But what are the ramifications of the AB Tire Report? What will happen 
when the U.S.-China Protocol expires in December 2013? What legal 
implications does the AB Tire Report have on other trade industries such as the 
solar industry? In the tire dispute, unlike previous failed disputes, the United 
States adequately showed that imports from China were “increasing rapidly” and 
that these imports “caused significant harm to the domestic industry.”11 Other 
trade industries may be levied with tariffs by the United States because, from a 
statistical standpoint, their percentage of imports is similar to percentages found 
in the tire dispute.12 For example, because solar industry imports are at a similar 
level to tire imports, the WTO may uphold tariffs imposed on China by the U.S. 
solar industry.13 Thus, it is likely that the United States will experience success in 
subsequent trade disputes with China. 
Part II of this Comment introduces the background and procedure of China’s 
accession into the WTO and discusses the U.S.-China Protocol and its 
implications. Part III analyzes the initial 2009 tire dispute followed by an 
explanation of the AB Tire Report. Part IV examines the legal implications the 
AB Tire Report would have had on the previous U.S.-China Steel Dispute from 
2003. In addition, Part IV will compare the AB Tire Report and what effects, if 
any, it may have on other current international trade disputes, such as the solar 
industry. It also discusses the possible effects and options once the U.S.-China 
Protocol expires in December 2013. 
In Part V, the Comment concludes that because the AB Tire Report expanded 
definitions of critical terms within the U.S.-China Protocol and because other 
industries, such as the solar industry are importing at similar levels to the tire 
industry, the United States will likely experience success in subsequent trade 
disputes with China. 
 
measure to be upheld was under the GATT system in 1951. Dispute Settlement: WTO Adopts Reports on 
China/US Tyres Case, WTO (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/dsb_05oct11_e.htm. 
8. The European spelling is “tyres.” However, I will use the American spelling “tires” throughout this 
Comment. 
9. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and 
Light Truck Tyres from China, WT/DS399/AB/R (Sept. 5, 2011). 
10. Dispute Settlement: WTO Adopts Reports on China/US Tyres Case, supra note 7 (noting that the last 
such occurrence under the GATT system was in 1951).  
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra Part IV.B. 
13. See infra Part IV.B. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
China’s emergence as a global power and its consistent growth since the 
1980s into the third-largest economy is astonishing.14 Despite China’s 
exceptionally rapid growth of trade with other nations in the 1980s and 1990s,15 
on December 11, 2001, after nearly fifteen years of contentious and tortuous 
negotiations, China finally joined the WTO.16 At the time of China’s accession to 
the WTO, China was the largest developing country in the world.17 There are 
obvious reasons why China would view WTO membership as beneficial.18 
Arguably, the two biggest benefits China enjoys by joining the WTO are lowered 
tariffs on its exports and the removal of non-tariff barriers.19 
Established on January 1, 1995, the WTO is the organization responsible for 
regulating international trade,20 as it replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”) as the international trading system.21 The goal of the WTO 
is to level the playing field within the international trading system by eliminating 
discrimination and promoting global free trade by way of multilateral 
negotiations among member countries.22 The WTO wants to ensure that “trade 
flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as possible.”23 This is accomplished 
through the Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) concept.24 MFN requires that any 
advantage or privilege given to one member country must be given to all member 
countries.25 MFN is based on a concept of non-discrimination and full 
 
14. Pasha L. Hsieh, China’s Development of International Economic Law and WTO Legal Capacity 
Building, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 997, 997 (2010). 
15. Xiaohui Wu, Agora: Ten Years of China’s Participation in the WTO: No Longer Outside, Not Yet 
Equal: Rethinking China’s Membership in the World Trade Organization, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 227, 229 
(2011). 
16. Jing Ma, Product-Specific Safeguard in China’s WTO Accession Agreement: An Analysis of its 
Terms and its Initial Application in Section 421 Investigations, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 189, 189 (2004); Henry Gao, 
China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 41 (2007); see Wu, 
supra note 15, at 228. 
17. Wu, supra note 15, at 228. 
18. Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27 B.C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 332 (2004). Two obvious benefits to joining the WTO include the “benefit from 
the recognition and prestige that WTO membership brings” and “deepen[ing] China’s integration into the world 
economy and signal[ing] its status as a world economic power.” Id. 
19. Gao, supra note 16, at 48. As a WTO member, China benefits from MFN tariff rates, which are 
lower than previous rates applicable to China before the accession. Id. 
20. MICHAEL P. MALLOY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 241 (forthcoming). 
21. Loridas, supra note 1, at 405. 
22. Id. 
23. Lynam, supra note 3, at 743. 
24. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT] (adopting the MFN concept). 
25. Id. (requiring that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” be consistently granted to all 
members); see also Loridas, supra note 1, at 406-07; see also Thomas P. Holt, CNOOC-UNOCAL and the 
WTO: Discriminatory Rules in the China Protocol Are a Latent Threat to the Rule of Law in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 457, 474 (2006). 
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transparency.26 Therefore, if any privilege or advantage is extended to one WTO 
member state, it must also be granted to all member states.27 
China was granted permanent MFN status by the United States during 
China’s accession to the WTO.28 Prior to being granted MFN status, China was 
required to submit to “highly controversial and politicized annual reviews” by the 
U.S. Congress pursuant to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade 
Act.29 With the annual reviews abolished, China’s accession to the WTO was 
looked upon as a major step towards developing a more transparent and globally 
competitive economy within the world trading system.30 However, the question 
remained whether China would be governed by the normal WTO Safeguard 
Agreement (“WTO Product-Specific Safeguard”) like other member nations 
before the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”).31 
A. WTO Product-Specific Safeguard 
One of the highly contested issues in the negotiation process was the WTO 
Product-Specific Safeguard clause and how it would be applied to China.32 One 
consequence or advantage33 of China’s accession to the WTO is access to the 
WTO DSB.34 Annex 2 of the WTO Charter creates the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (“DSU”) which all member states are subject to.35 The DSU 
subsequently creates the DSB36 and authorizes the DSB to establish a standing 
 
26. Loridas, supra note 1, at 406-07; see also Holt, supra note 25, at 474. 
27. Loridas, supra note 1, at 406-07; see also Holt, supra note 25, at 474. 
28. Wu, supra note 15, at 237. 
29. Id. at 237-38. Under the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, Congress was required to annually review 
China and its trading practices and decide whether or not to extend MFN status to China for that year. The 
economic risks caused by the annual review of U.S. Congress were enormous and thus, China was eager to get 
rid of it. Id.; see also Charles Tiefer, SINO 301: How Congress Can Effectively Review Relations with China 
After WTO Accession, 34 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 55, 60-62 (2001); see Gao, supra note 16, at 45. 
30. Wu, supra note 15, at 237. 
31. See Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Agreement art. XIX, available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg.pdf [hereinafter Agreement on Safeguards]; Fabio Spadi, Discriminatory 
Safeguards in the Light of the Admission of the People’s Republic of China to the World Trade Organization, 5 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 421, 421 (2002). 
32. Spadi, supra note 31, at 421. 
33. See Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China’s Capacity to Implement World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 399, 485 (2002) 
(discussing consequences of the DSB in relation to China’s capacity to comply); but see Wu, supra note 15, at 
238 (stating one advantage is China’s access to the DSB allows China the opportunity to bring other members 
to the DSB for WTO-inconsistent measures and seek redress). 
34. Wu, supra note 15, at 238. 
35. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter 
DSU]; see also MALLOY ET AL., supra note 20, at 239. 
36. DSU, supra note 35, at art. 2. 
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AB37 capable of resolving disputes between member states.38 Settlement of 
disputes between WTO members is the sole responsibility of the DSB.39 Because 
all member states are subject to the DSU and DSB, the DSB enjoys mandatory, 
compulsory jurisdiction.40 Therefore, regardless of whether or not China would 
be governed by the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard, China would be entitled to 
resolve all disputes before the DSB.41 
Pursuant to GATT Article XIX,42 known as the “escape clause,” the WTO 
Product-Specific Safeguard permits members to depart from its GATT 
obligations “to the extent necessary to address serious injury to a domestic 
industry caused by imports”43 (i.e. safeguard measures). Members may apply 
safeguard measures to a product only if “such product is being imported into its 
territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, 
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the 
domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.”44 
The traditional view of this measure is that it should apply in a non-
discriminatory manner to all WTO member nations.45 Unfortunately for China, 
this safeguard measure does not apply to China or any products imported from 
China.46 This is because within the procedure of WTO accession, China was 
required to enter bilateral negotiations with other member nations and agreed-
upon accession terms as drafted and outlined in a protocol of accession 
document.47 In other words, prior to WTO membership, the protocol of accession 
document represented the rudimentary terms of entry for China into the WTO.48 
B. China as a Non-Market Economy and the U.S.-China Protocol 
In November 1999, the United States and China finally signed a bilateral 
agreement on China’s accession to the WTO (“U.S.-China Protocol”).49 
However, it did not take effect until China was officially voted into the WTO at 
 
37. Id. at art. 17. 
38. MALLOY ET AL., supra note 20, at 240. 
39. Id. at 717. 
40. Gao, supra note 16, at 71; see also Wu, supra note 15, at 238. 
41. Gao, supra note 16, at 71.  
42. GATT, supra note 24, at art. XIX.  
43. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 31; see also MALLOY ET AL., supra note 20, at 242. 
44. Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 31. 
45. Spadi, supra note 31, at 422.  
46. Ma, supra note 16, at 195. 
47. Halverson, supra note 18, at 324. 
48. Duncan, supra note 33, at 459; see Halverson, supra note 18, at 323-24 (explaining that accession 
requires bilateral negotiations finalized in “three documents: the working party report, the protocol of accession, 
and the attached schedules contain[ing] the new member’s specific liberalization commitments.”). 
49. Halverson, supra note 18, at 324. 
[8] ANDERSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/20131:42 PM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26 
193 
the Doha Ministerial Meeting in November 2001.50 Because the expiration of the 
U.S.-China Protocol is set for twelve years after accession, it is to expire in 
December 2013.51 
1. Implications of China Categorized as a Non-Market Economy 
Despite China’s requests to be categorized as a comprehensive “developing 
country” when ascending to the WTO,52 and after arduous negotiations, China 
reluctantly acquiesced to be treated as a “non-market economy” (“NME”).53 
Therefore, China, as an NME, is subject to specific conditions by other WTO 
members, including the United States.54 China agreed to be treated as an NME for 
a period of fifteen years from the date of its accession to the WTO; thus, it will 
expire in December 2016.55 
Had China been categorized as a “developing country” during its accession 
to the WTO, the U.S-China Protocol would be non-existent and, therefore, China 
would not be susceptible to a lower threshold of product-specific safeguards as 
found within the U.S.-China Protocol.56 Furthermore, had China been categorized 
as a “developing country,” member nations would need to show that imports are 
causing “serious injury,” rather than “a significant cause of material injury.”57 
However, since China consented into the WTO as an NME, this lower threshold 
of injuries found in the U.S.-China Protocol only applies to China and products 
imported from China.58 Because many members worried that the application of 
normal safeguard measures under the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard 
Agreement might not be enough to counter the China threat,59 China had to agree 
to a special safeguard mechanism in its accession package: the U.S.-China 
Protocol.60 
 
50. Id. at 324-25. 
51. Gao, supra note 16, at 55-56; see also Halverson, supra note 18, at 330-31.  
52. Wu, supra note 15, at 235.  
53. Id. at 239; see Lynam, supra note 3, at 748 (stating that the United States labels China as a “NME 
despite the fact that there are pockets of market-oriented economies in China”). 
54. Wu, supra note 15, at 239; see Lynam, supra note 3, at 748. 
55. Carlos Esplugues Mota, Chapter 1: China’s Accession to WTO, in CHINESE BUSINESS LAW 1, 9 
(2010). 
56. Wu, supra note 15, at 239.  
57. See supra Part II (explaining the differing injury thresholds between the WTO Product-Specific 
Safeguard and the U.S.-China Protocol). 
58. Wu, supra note 15, at 239.  
59. Gao, supra note 16, at 55-56; see Halverson, supra note 18, at 325 (explaining that WTO members 
viewed China as a major source of cheap labor imports and thus a threat to domestic industry); see Spadi, supra 
note 31, at 430 (stating concerns including China’s lack of transparency, the high number of state enterprises, 
and the constant role of central and local authorities). 
60. Gao, supra note 16, at 55. 
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2. U.S.-China Protocol 
Compared with the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard mechanisms applicable 
to other member states, the special “transitional product-specific safeguard” 
mechanism (“TPSS”) found within the U.S.-China Protocol includes many 
unique features.61 First, the TPSS may be “triggered by ‘market disruption,’ 
which is deemed to exist so long as imports are ‘a significant cause of material 
injury,’ rather than causing ‘serious injury,’ as would have been required under 
the [WTO Product-Specific] Safeguards Agreement.”62 Second, the TPSS only 
applies to China and products imported from China.63 Third, pursuant to the 
WTO Product-Specific Safeguard, if “a safeguard measure” is imposed on “an 
increase of imports, the affected export members are allowed to retaliate 
immediately.”64 However, the TPSS provides that China has “the right to retaliate 
only if such [safeguard] measures remain in effect for more than two years.”65 
These and other unique variances between the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard 
and U.S.-China Protocol provide for substantial differences in application and 
outcome of disputes within the DSB.66 
The U.S.-China Protocol remains in effect for twelve years after succession 
and is set to expire in December 2013.67 The first unique feature is found in 
Article 16 of the U.S.-China Protocol. Article 1, paragraph 16.1 of the 
“Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism” section of the U.S.-China 
Protocol provides: 
In cases where products of Chinese origin are being imported into the 
territory of any WTO Member in such increased quantities or under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the 
domestic producers of like or directly competitive products, the WTO 
Member so affected may request consultations with China with a view to 
seeking a mutually satisfactory solution, including whether the affected 
WTO Member should pursue application of a measure under the 
Agreement on Safeguards . . . .68 
Compared with the normal WTO Product-Specific Safeguard Agreement 
which applies to all other MFN members, the TPPS is “triggered by ‘market 
 
61. Id. at 55-56. 
62. Id. at 55. 
63. Id. at 55-56.  
64. Id. at 55. 
65. Id. 
66. Id.; see supra Part II. 
67. Gao, supra note 16, at 55-56; see Halverson, supra note 18, at 330-31.  
68. WTO Ministerial Conference, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, 
WT/L/432, at art.16.1 (Nov. 23, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc. 
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disruption’ which . . . exist[s] so long as imports are ‘a significant cause of 
material injury,’ rather than causing ‘serious injury’” as applied to other MFN 
member countries within the WTO.69 In determining whether market disruption 
exists, Paragraph 16.4 of the same section provides: 
Market disruption shall exist whenever imports of an article, like or 
directly competitive with an article produced by the domestic industry, 
are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a 
significant cause of material injury, or threat of material injury to the 
domestic industry. In determining if market disruption exists, the 
affected WTO Member shall consider objective factors, including the 
volume of imports, the effect of imports on prices for like or directly 
competitive articles, and the effect of such imports on the domestic 
industry producing like or directly competitive products.70 
Thus, “[t]he TPSS allows other WTO members to impose” quantitative 
restrictions and “tariffs on Chinese goods upon a minimal showing of injury, and 
it restricts China’s ability to retaliate.”71 In other words, “the threshold” for 
imposing safeguard measures against China “is at its lowest point.”72 As stated, 
the U.S.-China Protocol not only “singles out China,” but imposes a number “of 
highly specific” and “unique” obligations “not required of any other WTO 
member.”73 
Despite the lessened threshold of “material injury” needed to obtain relief, 
the WTO AB has never completely upheld a safeguard measure dispute against 
China.74 However, on September 5, 2011, the WTO released the AB Tire Report 
which was in favor of the United States.75 Prior to the WTO AB Tire Report, the 
last time safeguard measures were upheld in favor of the United States was in 
1951, but it was under the then existing and governing GATT system.76 
 
69. Gao, supra note 16, at 55.  
70. WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 68, § III, art. 1, ¶ 16.4. 
71. Halverson, supra note 18, at 331; see Thomas Peele III, U.S. Trade Law Affecting China After 
China’s Accession to the WTO, 817 PRACTICING L. INST. 115, 140 (2001) (providing that such measures may 
take various forms including increased tariffs, quotas or tariff-rate quotas). 
72. Spadi, supra note 31, at 441.  
73. Holt, supra note 25, at 479; see also supra Part II.B (outlining the specific and unique obligations of 
the U.S.-China Protocol). 
74. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11; Gao, supra note 16, at 55.  
75. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9.  
76. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11; see also Dispute Settlement: WTO Adopts Reports on China/US 
Tyres Case, supra note 7 (noting that the last such occurrence under the GATT system was in 1951).  
[8] ANDERSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/20131:42 PM 
2013 / WTO Appellate Body Upholds U.S. Safeguard Measures  
196 
III. THERE IS A FIRST TIME FOR EVERYTHING: WTO APPELLATE BODY 
COMPLETELY UPHOLDS SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN TIRE DISPUTE 
On September 5, 2011, the WTO issued its AB Tire Report regarding certain 
imported tires from China in favor of the United States.77 The AB “affirmed an 
earlier ruling by a WTO dispute settlement panel” (“Panel Report”), which held 
“that the United States did not act inconsistently with its WTO obligations when 
it imposed a tariff . . . on imports of certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires 
from China.”78 
A. Initial Tire Dispute—Findings in Panel Report 
The initial dispute arose in 2007 when a petition was filed with the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (“USITC”) on behalf of the United Steel 
Workers (“USW”) “accusing Chinese manufacturers of exporting” certain 
subsidized tires “to the U.S. market to the detriment of the domestic industry.”79 
Subsequently, U.S. President Barack Obama, by invoking the TPPS clause in the 
U.S.-China Protocol, “imposed a safeguard measure on imports of subject t[i]res 
in the form of additional import duties for a three-year period: 35% ad valorem in 
the first year; 30% ad valorem in the second year; and 25% ad valorem in the 
third year.”80 The measure took effect on September 26, 2009.81 
The WTO Panel Body reviewed import data from 2004 through 2008, the 
period of investigation, and noted annual percentage increases in imports 
between 2005 and 2008.82 Based on this data, the Panel held that imports from 
China were “increasing rapidly” for the following reasons: 
In absolute terms, imports of subject tires from China increased 
throughout the period of investigation and were the highest, in terms of 
both quantity and value, in 2008, at the end of the period. The quantity of 
 
77. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9. 
78. WTO Appellate Body Upholds Special Safeguard Measures Imposed by the United States on Certain 
Chinese Tires, MAYER BROWN (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article. 
asp?id=11548&nid=6. 
79. Alexis Early, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: What Chinese Tires Mean for Obama’s Trade 
Policy, 6 BUS. L. BRIEF 63, 63 (2010). 
80. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9; see also Tyre Production Continues to Rise in August, 
AUTOMOTIVEWORLD (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.automotiveworld.com/news/suppliers/89375-china-tyre-
production-continues-to-rise-in-august; see also US Trade Officials, Unions Hail WTO Ruling on China Tyres, 
MORRIS ANDERSON (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.morrisanderson.com/resource-center/entry/US-trade-officials-
unions-hail-WTO-ruling-on-China-tyres/. 
81. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light 
Truck Tyres from China, para. 2.2, WT/DS399/R (Dec. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Panel Report]; see JEFFREY L. 
KESSLER & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 12:7 (2d ed. 
2011). 
82. Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.83; Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, para. 150. 
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subject imports rose by 215.5 percent between 2004 and 2008, by 53.7 
percent between 2006 and 2007, and by 10.8 percent between 2007 and 
2008. The value of subject imports rose even more rapidly, increasing by 
294.5 percent between 2004 and 2008, by 60.2 percent between 2006 and 
2007, and by 19.8 percent between 2007 and 2008.83 
However, China pointed out that because there was a decline in the rate of 
increase in subject imports in 2008 to 10.8 percent, this undermined the U.S. 
argument of “increasing rapidly” within the meaning of Paragraph 16.4 of the 
U.S.-China Protocol.84 Unfortunately for China, the Panel did not agree and 
explained that: 
[T]he fact that the 10.8 [percent] increase in 2008 was lower than the 
increase in the preceding year does not mean that imports were not 
“increasing rapidly” in 2008. An increase of 10.8 [percent] in 2008 by no 
means precludes a finding that imports are “increasing rapidly”, 
especially when that increase is assessed in context. Nor is it a “modest” 
increase. In this regard, we recall that the 10.8 [percent] increase in 
absolute volumes between 2007 and 2008 was in addition to an increase 
of 53.7 [percent] between 2006 and 2007, which was in addition to an 
increase of 29.9 [percent] between 2005 and 2006, which was in addition 
to an increase of 42.7 [percent] between 2004 and 2005. In our view, the 
10.8 [percent] increase in absolute volumes from 2007 to 2008 reinforces 
the USITC’s conclusion that imports were “increasing rapidly” during 
the period, and continued to be “increasing rapidly” at the end of the 
period.85 
The Panel went on to state that, over the period of investigation, the market 
share of subject imports increased by twelve percent, whereas the ratio of subject 
imports relative to domestic production increased by twenty-two percent over the 
entire period.86 Based on this, the Panel concluded that “regardless of a focus on 
imports relative to market share or relative to domestic production there were 
increases from year to year and significant increases over the period of 
investigation.”87 
 
83. Panel Report, supra note 81, paras. 7.85-7.86.  
84. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at paras. 155, 161 (quoting Notification of an Appeal by 
China, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from 
China, paras. 159-63, WT/DS399/6 (May 27, 2011) [hereinafter China’s Appellant’s Submission]). 
85. Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.93. 
86. Id. at para. 7.96. 
87. Id. at para. 7.98. 
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Because of these statistics and the evidence shown by the United States, the 
Panel Report was issued in favor of the United States on December 13, 2010.88 
China appealed the decision on May 24, 2011.89 
B. Appellate Body Tire Report 
In its appeal, China argued that the Panel erred in its application of the 
“increasing rapidly” standard because the investigating authorities, the USITC, 
should not have assessed import increases over the entire five-year period 
between 2004 and 2008.90 Moreover, China argued that the term “rapidly” in 
“increasing rapidly” requires that investigating authorities focus on the rates of 
increase in subject imports.91 In addition, China argued that the Panel erred when 
it established that rapidly increasing imports from China was “a significant 
cause” of material injury to the U.S. industry because, as China alleged, the word 
“significant” requires a heightened causation standard, which the United States 
had failed to prove.92 
1. Clarification of the Term “Increasing Rapidly” within the U.S.-China 
Protocol 
China argued that investigating authorities and the USITC should not have 
assessed import increases over the entire five-year period.93 Rather, China argued 
that the definition of “increasing” means the most recent period: thus in this case, 
the Panel should have only looked at import data during 2008.94 
The United States responded by arguing that because there is no explicitly 
prescribed period of investigation in Paragraph 16.4 of the U.S.-China Protocol, 
that authorities have discretion to select any period, provided that it allows for an 
assessment of import increases during a “recent period.”95 
The AB was not persuaded by China’s arguments.96 The AB held that 
“nothing in the use of the present continuous tense ‘are increasing’ in Paragraph 
16.4 and ‘are being imported’ in Paragraph 16.1 implies that the analysis must be 
limited to import data relating to the very end of the period of investigation.”97 
 
88. Id. at para. 2.2. 
89. Id. at annex I. 
90. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 143. 
91. Id. at para. 154. 
92. Id. at para. 173. 
93. Id. at para. 143. 
94. Id. at paras. 142-43. 
95. Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.88. 
96. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text; see generally Appellate Body Report, supra note 9. 
97. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 147. 
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Thus, to use only import data relating to 2008 would be incorrect.98 The AB 
subsequently held that the term “increasing rapidly” required investigating 
authorities to evaluate import trends over a “sufficiently recent period,” and to 
determine whether imports are significantly increasing within a short period of 
time.99 Moreover, the period between 2004 and 2008, as analyzed by the USITC, 
was a sufficiently recent period and was therefore correct as the United States 
had alleged.100 
China additionally argued that the term “rapidly” in “increasing rapidly” 
requires that investigating authorities focus on the rates of increase in subject 
imports.101 Without focusing on the rates of increase, China argued, “there is no 
way to determine whether an increase is occurring at a ‘great speed . . . .’”102 
China emphasized “that ‘rapidly’ is a relative concept, which conveys the idea 
that something is increasing more quickly than something else, and therefore it is 
‘useful’ to assess the rates of increase in subject imports.”103 
The United States countered China’s definition of “rapidly” and claimed that 
“rapidly” does not require that imports be increasing not only “swiftly” or 
“quickly,” but also “at an accelerating rate of increase.”104 The AB, reaffirming 
the Panel Report and concurring with the United States, held that the text of 
Paragraph 16.4 “requires that imports—and not the rates of increase in imports— 
be increasing ‘rapidly.’”105 The AB went on to explain that although it may be 
useful for investigating authorities to review rates of increase in imports, a 
decline in the yearly rate of increase does not “necessarily preclude a finding that 
imports are ‘increasing rapidly.’”106 After elaborating the definition of “increasing 
rapidly,” the AB continued its analysis by further defining the term “a significant 
cause.”107 
2. Clarification of the Term “Significant Cause” within the U.S.-China 
Protocol 
China argued for several reasons that the USITC erred when it established 
that rapidly increasing imports from China was “a significant cause” of material 
injury to the domestic industry under Paragraph 16.4 of the U.S.-China 
 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at para. 167. 
100. Id. at para. 147. 
101. Id. at para. 154. 
102. Id.  
103. Id. 
104. Id. at para. 156. 
105. Id. at para. 158. 
106. Id. (quoting Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.92).  
107. Id.  
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Protocol.108 First, China argued that the term “significant” imposes a more 
rigorous causation standard requiring a “particularly strong, substantial, and 
important causal connection” between rapidly increasing imports and material 
injury to the domestic industry.109 
The AB, in its effort to define the term “significant cause,” looked at the 
ordinary meaning of the term and held that Paragraph 16.4 suggested that 
“rapidly increasing imports must be an ‘important’ or ‘notable’ factor in 
‘bringing about, producing, or inducing’ material injury to the domestic 
industry.”110 Thus, the AB held that a more rigorous causation standard, as argued 
by China, is not necessary.111 
The WTO AB concluded that the surge of Chinese tire imports within the 
United States constituted “a significant cause of material injury to the domestic 
industry,” and thus, the tariffs were consistent with international trade 
agreements.112 The United States argued before the DSB that the volume of 
Chinese tire imports had more than tripled in the previous four years, to reach 
$1.8 billion in value, while the U.S. production had shrunk by more than twenty-
five percent in the same period, with fourteen percent of U.S. workers in the 
industry losing their jobs.113 
Despite China’s argument that a decrease in the rate of increase during 2008 
signifies a lack of “increasing rapidly,” the AB found no error in the Panels’ 
reasoning and concluded that a decline in the rates of increase in imports towards 
the end of the period of investigation was nevertheless sufficient to constitute 
“increasing rapidly” in both relative and absolute terms.114 
Since this is the first safeguard dispute to be completely upheld by the WTO, 
what are its likely effects? Will it undermine or provide guidance to current 
pending and subsequent disputes not only within the tire industry but other 
international trade industries? What will happen after the U.S.-China Protocol 
expires in December 2013? 
   
 
108. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 171. 
109. Id. at para. 173 (quoting China’s Appellant’s Submission, supra note 84, at para. 193). 
110. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 176. 
111. Id. at para. 181. 
112. WTO Rules Against China in US Tyre Imports Case, DOMAIN-B (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.domain-b.com/organisation/wto/20110906_us_tyre.html. 
113. Prakash Narayanan & Andrew Thompson, World Trade Organization 2010 Marks an Important 
Shift for China, BLAKES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.blakes.com/english/view_bulletin.asp?ID=4581. 
114. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 161-62. 
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IV. REEVALUATING THE U.S.-CHINA STEEL DISPUTE, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE AB TIRE REPORT ON THE SOLAR INDUSTRY AND THE EXPIRATION OF THE 
U.S.-CHINA PROTOCOL 
Because the AB Tire Report was the first time a safeguard measure was 
completely upheld under the current WTO,115 it is regarded as having great legal 
significance. It has been stated that the U.S.-China Protocol is wrought with 
unworkable vague ambiguities, and therefore, if the United States hopes to be 
successful in international trade disputes against China, the United States needs 
to address these ambiguities.116 The release of the AB Tire Report helped clarify 
some of the unworkable vague ambiguities because the AB specifically defined 
key terms within the U.S.-China Protocol.117 Applying the recently defined key 
terms to current and potential future safeguard disputes, it is possible to gain 
insight on their likely outcomes.118 However, since the U.S.-China Protocol 
expires in December 2013,119 the future of current safeguard tariffs is uncertain 
and WTO members may be limited in bringing and sustaining safeguard 
measures against China. 
A. Reevaluation of the 2003 U.S.-China Steel Dispute 
The AB Tire Report provides essential definitions of key terms within the 
U.S.-China Protocol vital for subsequent international trade disputes.120 
Significant terms explained by the AB include: “increasing,” “rapidly,” 
“significant cause,” and “material injury.”121 Knowing how future WTO appellate 
bodies will apply these terms found in Paragraphs 16.4 and 16.1 of the U.S.-
China Protocol will assist the United States and other countries in determining 
how and whether or not subsequent disputes should be filed.122 In fact, the 
European Union welcomed the findings of the Panel and AB reports.123 U.S. 
Trade Representative Ron Kirk called the ruling a “tremendous victory” for 
American workers and U.S. manufacturers and continued by stating that the 
 
115. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11. 
116. Lynam, supra note 3, at 743; Jennifer Rivett Schick, Agreement on Safeguards: Realistic Tools for 
Protecting Domestic Industry or Protectionist Measures?, 27 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 153, 186-88 
(2003); see also generally TERENCE P. STEWART, CHINA IN THE WTO – YEAR 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2005/05_01_21_china_inthe_wto.htm. 
117. See supra Part III.B. 
118. See infra Part IV. 
119. Ji & Huang, supra note 7, at 11. 
120. See supra Part III.B. 
121. See supra Part III.B. 
122. Lynam, supra note 3, at 743; Schick, supra note 116, at 186-88; see also generally STEWART, 
supra note 116. 
123. Dispute Settlement: WTO Adopts Reports on China/US Tyres Case, supra note 7. 
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Obama administration will continue to fight for U.S. jobs and businesses.124 
Cognizant of the newly defined key terms in the AB Tire Report, it is now 
possible to reanalyze the unsuccessful causation requirement in the 2003 U.S.-
China Steel Dispute.125 
1. United States’ Failure to Establish Causation in the U.S.-China Steel 
Dispute 
One reason why the United States was not successful in prior disputes before 
the DSB was the failure to establish a causal link between increased imports of a 
product and “serious injury or threat thereof.”126 In other words, prior to the AB 
Tire Report, in order to satisfy the WTO causation requirement, a member 
country had to prove that the injury was caused by increased imports alone.127 
On March 5, 2002, the United States imposed a safeguard measure on $8.5 
billion worth of certain steel products.128 Nine members, including China, were 
complainants who claimed the tariffs violated WTO provisions.129 On July 11, 
2003, the WTO Panel ruled on the U.S.-China Steel Dispute that the U.S. tariffs 
on imported steel were illegal.130 Specifically, the Panel concluded that the United 
States violated the parallelism requirement (i.e. “a significant cause”) and did not 
provide a reasoned and adequate explanation for its support to use a tariff.131 
Additionally, the relevant data during the five and a half-year period in which the 
AB reviewed, indicated that imports of subject steel products did not steadily 
increase, but increased for part of the period and decreased during the remaining 
months or years.132 
One flaw by the United States in the U.S.-China Steel Dispute was failing to 
account for and adequately explain away other potential factors attributable to the 
 
124. United States Prevails in WTO Dispute About Chinese Tire Imports, OFF. U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Sept. 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/september/ 
united-states-prevails-wto-dispute-about-chinese. 
125. Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products, WT/DS248/AB/R (Oct. 9, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_ 
e/distabase_wto_members4_e.htm [hereinafter Steel Appellate Body Report]; see supra Part III.B. 
126. Morgan Frohman, Is Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 Consistent with the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Safeguards?, 17 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 127, 149 (2004). 
127. Id.  
128. Id. at 133. 
129. Wei Zhuang, An Empirical Study of China’s Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism: 2001-2010, 4 L. DEV. REV. 217, 236 (2011). 
130. Steel Appellate Body Report, supra note 125; see also Frohman, supra note 126, at 135. 
131. Frohman, supra note 126, at 141. Parallelism requires that imports included in the injury 
determination must correspond to the imports covered by the safeguard measure. Id. at 158-59. In other words, 
a country may only apply safeguard measures to a product if the increased imports are the cause of injury to the 
domestic injury. Id. at 159. 
132. Steel Appellate Body Report, supra note 125, at para. 26; see also Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, 
WTO Case Review 2003, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 405-06 (2004). 
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alleged injury.133 In other words, the United States failed to convince the WTO 
Panel Body that steel imports were “a significant cause” of the domestic injury.134 
Brazil argued against the United States in the dispute claiming that the decline of 
the U.S. steel industry was because the U.S. steel industry was “weak, 
fragmented, and saddled with inefficient and/or antiquated capacity well in 
excess of demand” and not as a result from increased imports from U.S. foreign 
trading partners.135 Additionally, other foreign trading partners such as the 
European Union, New Zealand, and Switzerland argued that the “differences in 
inputs and production methods” along with the U.S. steel industries’ “transition 
to become modern and more efficient” was the cause of the domestic injury.136 In 
the U.S.-China Steel Dispute, the United States failed to meet the causation 
requirement due to the vagueness and the ambiguity of the term “a significant 
cause.”137 The AB Tire Report now helps clarify this otherwise ambiguous term 
within the U.S.-China Protocol.138 
2. AB Tire Report Assists in Clarifying the Causation Requirement in the 
U.S.-China Protocol 
The recent AB Tire Report helps clarify the vagueness of the term “a 
significant cause” within the U.S.-China Protocol.139 Because the AB held that “a 
significant cause” must be an “important” or “notable” factor in “bringing about, 
producing, or inducing material injury to the domestic industry,”140 it suggests a 
less rigorous standard than what the Panel held nearly ten years ago in the U.S.-
China Steel Dispute.141 Therefore, even if one of the causes of domestic injury 
was the steel industries’ need for reorganization, it is plausible that under the 
current AB’s definition of “a significant cause,” as long as the United States 
showed that foreign steel imports was an “important” or “notable” factor in 
bringing about the material injury, the United States may have been successful in 
establishing causation. Another relevant factor is that subject imports in both the 
2003 U.S.-China Steel Dispute and the 2009 tire dispute actually decreased in 
one or more preceding years.142 
 
133. Frohman, supra note 126, at 149-50 (complainants argued that injury within the steel industry was 
caused by its need for reorganization and not as a result from increased imports from foreign member 
countries); see Steel: Volume I: Determinations and Views of Commissioners, Inv. No. 201-TA-73, USITC 
Pub. 3479 (Dec. 20, 2001) (Final). 
134. Frohman, supra note 126, at 149-50. 
135. Id. at 150. 
136. Id. at 150-51. 
137. Id. at 152. 
138. See supra Part III 
139. See supra Part III.B. 
140. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 176. 
141. Steel Appellate Body Report, supra note 125. 
142. See supra Parts III.A, IV.A. 
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In the tire dispute, addressing the decrease in imports from the preceding 
year, the Panel Report stated that even though a percent increase was lower than 
the preceding year, it “by no means precludes a finding that imports are 
‘increasing rapidly . . . .’”143 The AB Tire Report concurred with the Panel Report 
holding that although it may be “useful” for investigating authorities to review 
rates of increase in imports, a decline in the yearly rate of increase does not 
“necessarily preclude a finding that imports are ‘increasing rapidly.’”144 
Similarly, in the U.S.-China Steel Dispute, the relevant data during the 
subject period indicated that imports of subject steel products did not steadily 
increase, but increased for part of the period and decreased during the remaining 
months or years.145 Therefore, it is plausible under the AB Tire Report’s holding, 
that since a decrease in imports from the preceding year does not preclude the 
finding that imports are “increasing rapidly,” subject imports in the U.S.-China 
Steel Dispute nevertheless may have been held to be “increasing rapidly.”146 
One immediate ramification of the appellate finding is that China’s domestic 
tire sector may be consolidated.147 Shen Danyang, from China’s Ministry of 
Commerce, stated that the action “was a protectionist measure aimed at indulging 
domestic political pressures in the [United States] and it distorted the order of 
bilateral trade.”148 Shen went on to state that “[t]he move hurt the legitimate 
interests of Chinese enterprises, and brought no benefits to the U.S. side.”149 
Consolidation of the Chinese tire industry and other industries that may also be 
affected may have detrimental effects to both the industry and to trade relations 
between China and the United States and other member nations.150 
The constant barrage of international trade disputes between China and the 
United States may lead one to believe that safeguard measures are merely a form 
of global protectionism.151 Others believe safeguard measures are in the best 
 
143. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 7.93. 
144. Id. at para. 158 (quoting Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.92).  
145. Steel Appellate Body Report, supra note 125, at para. 26. 
146. See supra Part III.B. 
147. CRIA Expects Consolidation in Tyre Industry in Wake of WTO Tariff Ruling, RUBBER MARKET 
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://rubbermarketnews.net/2011/09/cria-expects-consolidation-in-tyre-industry-in-
wake-of-wto-tariff-ruling/. 
148. US Urged to Scrap Special Tariffs on Chinese Tires, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 20, 2011, 5:28 PM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-09/20/content_13744005.htm. 
149. Id. 
150. See id. 
151. See generally Jie Zhou, The Role and Impact of the New Global Protectionism in Recent U.S.-
China Trade Relations with Illustrations from China’s Toy and Tire Industries (2011) (unpublished MBus 
dissertation, Auckland University of Technology), available at http://aut.researchgateway.ac.nz/ 
bitstream/handle/10292/1217/JieZ.pdf?sequence=3 (arguing trade disputes between the United States and China 
are forms of global protectionism); see also Nan Sato, Red Dragon Gone Green: China’s Approach to 
Renewable Energy Technologies, Its Legal Implications, and Its Impact on U.S. Energy Policy, 2011 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 463, 476 (2011) (stating import duties are likely to be criticized as a form of trade 
protectionism). 
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interest of the United States in order to revive the U.S. economy by creating more 
jobs and maintaining opportunities for American companies.152 
In connection with this, another ramification is that since the AB Tire Report 
was in favor of the United States, it may encourage future trading disputes 
against China. On January 24, 2012, U.S. President Obama stated in his recent 
state-of-the-union address that his administration has brought trade cases against 
China “at nearly twice the rate as the last administration,” and announced the 
creation of an Enforcement Task Force to investigate unfair trade violations by 
China.153 This tougher stance on trade violations may have negative consequences 
to the already volatile China-U.S. trade relationship.154 On the other hand, it may 
boost the lagging U.S. economy and create more jobs for the American people.155 
This is because China’s unfair trade practices have created a huge trade gap 
between the United States and China that have cost Americans millions of jobs.156 
Therefore, by preventing these unfair trade practices through sanctions and 
dispute resolution, the effect is believed to boost the U.S. economy by creating 
more domestic U.S. jobs.157 
Whether or not an increase in litigation involving trading practices is viewed 
as positive158 or negative,159 one unsolved issue is what effect does the AB Tire 
Report have on other trade industries like solar panels? More specifically, what 
effects will the clarified terms of “increasing rapidly” and “a significant cause” 
have on current solar industry disputes? 
 
152. Zhu Qiwen, Commentary: Time for Plain Talk on Trade, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 3, 2004, 9:39AM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-02/03/content_302540.htm; see also Cary Huang, Obama Forms 
New Trade Body to Muscle China, CHINESE CIRCLE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.chinesecircle.com/?p=2041. 
153. Jeremy Bogaisky, Full Text: President Obama’s State of the Union Address, FORBES (Jan. 24, 
2012, 10:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2012/01/24/full-text-president-obamas-state-of-
the-union-address/; see also Cary Huang, President Obama is Likely to Focus on Securing Chinese Help for the 
Troubled US Economy: But He Can’t Expect Sweeping Gestures from Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 
12, 2012; see also Huang, supra note 152. 
154. Huang, supra note 152. Professor Tao Wenzhao from the Institute of American Studies of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences stated that he “can foresee more trade disputes and escalating rivalry in 
every realm in the year ahead, from trade and currency to regional security and global diplomacy.” Id.; see 
generally Stephen Rush & Sam Mirmirani, Can Increased Trade Prevent Conflict With China?, 8 INT’L BUS. & 
ECON. RESEARCH J. 2 (2009) (discussing the possible effects increased trade will have on U.S.-China relations 
and currency). 
155. Bogaisky, supra note 153 (President Obama states that toughening trade policy on China will 
increase the U.S. economy and create more American jobs); see also Huang, supra note 153. 
156. Martin Crutsinger, Congress Wants Tough Stance with China Over Trade, DENVER POST (Sept. 17, 
2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_16096873. 
157. See id. 
158. See Stuart Malawer, United States-China WTO Litigation (2001-2010): Active & Aggressive 
Litigants (UPDATED), 59 VA. LAW. 28, 32 (2010) (argues that increased litigation is good for the WTO and 
global trade relations because litigation creates a clarified rules-based trading system). 
159. See Huang, supra note 152. 
[8] ANDERSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/20131:42 PM 
2013 / WTO Appellate Body Upholds U.S. Safeguard Measures  
206 
B. Ramifications of the Appellate Body Tire Report on the Solar Trade Industry 
Another industry where current disputes between the United States and 
China are “heating up” is the photovoltaics industry (solar panel industry).160 In 
October 2011, Oregon-based PV producer SolarWorld and six unnamed solar 
companies filed an antidumping and countervailing duty petition with the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and the USITC against China.161 Pursuant to the 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT162 (“AIGATT”), dumping 
occurs when a product meant for domestic consumption is exported from one 
country to another at a lower price than the destination country’s comparable 
product.163 Additionally, WTO members are prohibited from subsidizing 
domestic manufacturers that produce products for exportation purposes; 
otherwise, countervailing duties may be accessed.164 The purpose of this rule is 
for the mutual assurance that a member’s conduct of legally assisting its domestic 
industry will not illegally injure the domestic industry of another member 
country.165 If a member country has reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy is 
being permitted, the injured country may invoke countervailing duties on subject 
exports.166 Although antidumping and countervailing duty petitions have some 
elements distinguishable to safeguard measures,167 they both share two factors 
relevant to this discussion: increasing rapidly and causation requirements.168 
According to USITC data, U.S. imports of solar panel components from 
China increased from less than $100 million to $1.2 billion between 2006 and 
2010.169 As of October 31, 2011, Chinese solar exports already reached $1.5 
billion.170 Meanwhile, China’s share of global solar exports increased from twelve 
 
160. Verbal Battle Intensifies Between US, China Over Charges of Dumping Solar PV Equipment, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY REP., Nov. 14, 2011. 
161. Id. 
162. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
154, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf. 
163. Sato, supra note 151, at 474.  
164. Id. at 473. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 474. 
167. Tiefer, supra note 29, at 76-78 (since dumping occurs when an exporter sells merchandise in the 
importing country at less than fair value or below the price of production, one main element of analysis is 
ascertaining the fair-market value or fair price of production within the exporter country); see also Peele III, 
supra note 71, at 140. 
168. See generally Peele III, supra note 71, at 140; see generally Tiefer, supra note 29, at 76-78 (when 
dumping causes or threatens injury in an importing country, that country may impose antidumping or 
countervailing measures).  
169. Keith Chu, Trade Wars Over Chinese Renewables Exports Resume with Senate Report, Complaint 
Filing, RENEWABLE ENERGY REP., Oct. 31, 2011. 
170. Id. 
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percent in 2006 to thirty-three percent in 2010, while the U.S. share shrunk from 
eight percent to four percent over the same time period.171 
Similar to the tire industry, where the value of imports increased by 294.5 
percent between 2004 and 2008,172 the value of imports within the solar industry 
increased 833.33 percent between 2006 and 2010.173 Because the value of solar 
industry imports far surpasses the value of tire industry imports during a five-
year period, the DSB may likely concur with United States’ allegations of 
‘increasing rapidly.” Additionally, because the AB held that “increasing rapidly” 
required investigating authorities “to assess import trends over a sufficiently 
recent period,”174 the 2006-2010 time period should suffice, just as the 2004-2008 
time period was sufficient in the tire dispute.175 
In addition, the United States would be required to establish a causal link 
between the dumped imports and the alleged injury.176 The AB Tire Report helps 
clarify this term. If the United States can show that the increase in solar imports 
is an “important” or “notable” factor in “bringing about, producing, or inducing” 
a material injury to the U.S. solar industry, the United States should satisfy the 
causation element of Section 16 of the U.S.-China Protocol.177 
Currently, many U.S. solar technology firms are struggling to survive and 
losing millions of dollars in the process.178 One illustration is Solyndra, a solar 
start-up manufacturer, which filed bankruptcy in August 2011, taking with it over 
$500 million in government loan guarantees.179 In fact, recent U.S. solar 
manufacturing firm bankruptcies and closings represent an almost one-fifth 
reduction of the solar panel manufacturing capacity in the United States.180 
Therefore, if the current solar dispute reaches the WTO DSB, assuming the 
United States is able to prove that China’s illegal subsidies and illegal dumping 
 
171. Id. 
172. Panel Report, supra note 81, at para. 7.85.  
173. Chu, supra note 169. 
174. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 167. 
175. Id. at para.147. 
176. Sato, supra note 151, at 474. 
177. Appellate Body Report, supra note 9, at para. 176. 
178. Bryan Walsh, The Coming U.S.-China Solar War, TIME (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.time.com/time/ 
health/article/0,8599,2105734,00.html. 
179. Id.; Anne C. Mulkern, Solyndra Bankruptcy Reveals Dark Clouds in Solar Power Industry, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/06/06greenwire-solyndra-bankruptcy-reveals-
dark-clouds-in-sol-45598.html?pagewanted=all. Analysts argue that one potential cause of Solyndra’s 
bankruptcy is that the price of panels has decreased more than 40% in a year because the Chinese government is 
investing in solar production (i.e. Chinese illegal subsidies), which has forced down product prices worldwide. 
Id. In contrast, other analysts argue the main reason for Solyndra’s bankruptcy was because Solyndra 
specialized in a unique commercial product, which was not generally useful for large fields or all rooftops, thus 
limiting its uses. Therefore, Solyndra misunderstood the marketplace. Id. 
180. Sato, supra note 151, at 464 (noting that the Solyndra bankruptcy and closing combined with two 
other major solar manufacturers’ bankruptcies, Evergreen Solar and SpectraWatt, represent almost one-fifth of 
the solar manufacturing capacity in the United States). 
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are an “important factor” in “bringing about” these U.S. material injuries, it is 
likely, under the precedent of the AB Tire Report, that the United States would 
be successful on both the “increasing rapidly” and causation requirements.181 
C. Expiration of the U.S.-China Protocol 
Since the U.S.-China Protocol, which authorizes safeguard measures, expires 
in December 2013,182 the ability for the United States to impose safeguard 
measures on other imports from China in the future is limited. Although Section 
16.6 of the U.S.-China Protocol allows a safeguard to be imposed “only for such 
period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the market disruption,” 
it does not limit the duration of the measure.183 The exact effect of the expiration 
of the U.S.-China Protocol is unclear.184 Does this mean new safeguard measures 
cannot be put in place after 2013? Can existing safeguards continue after this 
date? 
Despite some uncertainty once the U.S.-China Protocol expires, President 
Obama will still need a comprehensive trade policy to address the challenges of 
lower-priced imports.185 It is apparent that President Obama is aware of this as he 
recently announced in his state-of-the-union address that he is strengthening his 
policy on China.186 Some economists argue, however, that returning to 
multilateral agreements is the preferred course of action to boost lagging 
economies around the world as opposed to an increase in trade dispute 
litigation.187 
One possibility is that China could negotiate with the United States to grant 
China a market-economy status.188 However, it is unlikely that China will obtain 
market-economy status from the United States “due to a mixture of political and 
economic factors at play.”189 Additionally, the United States maintains that China 
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have some advantage.” Tracy Elizabeth Dardick, The US-China Safeguard Provision, The GATT, and Thinking 
Long Term, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 467, 476 (2005). 
188. Gao, supra note 16, at 68. As of 2007, thirty-seven economies have recognized the market 
economy status of China, excluding the United States. Id. 
189. Wu, supra note 15, at 265. Political factors include the U.S. policy of using China’s interest in a 
market economy status as a “leverage” with U.S. interests on “labor, currency, subsidy and other issues.” Id. at 
266. Economic factors include deepening trade deficits, Chinese currency revaluation, and labor standards. Id. 
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has yet to bring its trading laws into full compliance with WTO provisions.190 
Due to this, China may have to wait for the NME status to expire in its natural 
course in 2016.191 
It is apparent that the uncertainty of the U.S.-China Protocol expiration has 
deterred other U.S. industry groups from seeking safeguard measures.192 Since the 
Panel Report in favor of the United States was issued in 2009, no new safeguard 
petitions have been filed by U.S. industries.193 Although it may be unlikely that 
any new U.S. safeguard petitions will be filed before the U.S.-China Protocol 
expires in 2013,194 it does not preclude President Obama’s new Enforcement Task 
Force from investigating and eventually obtaining some relief from unfair trading 
practices either through the DSB or through subsequent bilateral agreements with 
China.195 However, the WTO may experience an abrupt influx in safeguard 
disputes filed against China by other countries such as Canada.196 
Once the U.S.-China Protocol expires, terms will most likely revert back to 
the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard Agreement, which is applicable to all 
members of the WTO.197 This may deter the United States somewhat from 
bringing future safeguard petitions against China because of the heightened 
“serious injury” standard under the normal WTO Product-Specific Safeguard.198 
Regardless, even though China’s nine-year membership within the WTO may be 
regarded as “still in its infancy,”199 it is evident that China is willing to protect its 
interests in future trade disputes.200 China also complains of being the victim of 
protectionist measures by the United States.201 Despite President Obama’s recent 
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198. See id. 
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announcement of creating the “Trade Enforcement Unit,”202 some economists 
argue that it would be more advantageous for him to use his executive power to 
bring China back to the negotiating table.203 
V. CONCLUSION 
After a long and arduous accession into the WTO, which incorporated a 
lower threshold of safeguard measures as found in the U.S.-China Protocol, 
China has quickly grown into one of the largest exporter/importer member states 
in the world.204 As of October 2010, China ranks number one in merchandise 
exports and number two in merchandise imports.205 Simultaneously, the United 
States ranks number two in merchandise exports and number one in merchandise 
imports.206 Because China and the United States are the two largest exporters and 
importers globally,207 trade disputes are likely to continue into the future.208 
Vital takeaways from the AB Tire Report are critical term definitions such as 
“increasing,” “rapidly,” and “a significant cause.” Thus, it is possible to apply 
these newly defined terms to on-going and subsequent trade disputes before the 
USITC and the WTO.209 The solar industry is one such example where the 
percentage of increased imports from China is near or beyond percentages found 
in the tire industry dispute, in which the WTO found in favor of the United 
States.210 Because the AB Tire Report is the first to completely uphold a 
safeguard measure, it provides vital and invaluable insight into predicting 
outcomes of disputes in the future.211 
One advantage to China is that the more restrictive U.S.-China Protocol is set 
to expire in December 2013.212 Once it expires, both countries will likely be 
bound under the WTO Product-Specific Safeguard Agreement, thus eliminating 
the lower causation and harm thresholds found in the U.S.-China Protocol.213 
Thereafter, the United States would need to show “serious injury” which may 
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deter future safeguard disputes with China.214 This is already evident in the fact 
that the United States has not filed any safeguard measures since 2009.215 
Due to the short time before the U.S.-China Protocol will expire, it is 
unlikely that any U.S. safeguard petitions will be filed until then.216 However, the 
AB Tire Report provides invaluable insight into how future international trade 
disputes between all WTO members will likely be analyzed and determined by 
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